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Essay
Kelo and the Constitutional Revolution that Wasn’t
BETHANY BERGER
Wesley Horton and Brendon Levesque are right that public outrage
over Kelo has overshadowed the real facts of the New London plan, and
that the decision only affirmed well-established precedent. But while the
facts were on New London’s side, those facts were harder to translate to
the public sympathy than the story of the white, female plaintiffs effectively
publicized by the Institute for Justice in the case. Kelo is also not Dred
Scott in even more ways than Horton and Levesque state. Unlike Scott v.
Sandford, Kelo preserved the rights of individuals to challenge taking of
their homes and receive compensation for the same. For lead plaintiff
Susette Kelo, this right to compensation resulted in a pay-out of about four
times the value of her little pink house. And while Scott v. Sandford helped
trigger a constitutional revolution, Kelo remains good law, and the state
legal response to it is more show than substance.
Although I agree with the authors on the big picture, I suggest caution
on their proposal for curbing eminent domain abuse. The scrutiny for
pretext they propose was established well before Kelo, but some of the
factors they suggest would discourage public-private partnerships that
may more effectively achieve public goals. While judges must police
governments for bias and favoritism, having inexpert judges make
decisions that are better left to planning experts and the public process will
not achieve this end.
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Kelo and the Constitutional Revolution that Wasn’t
BETHANY BERGER*
I. INTRODUCTION
I am delighted to have the chance to comment on Wesley Horton and
Brendon Levesque’s excellent article. I agree with them that the facts of
the Fort Trumbull plan have gotten lost in the public reaction to the case,
and that Kelo only affirmed well-established law. I also wholeheartedly
agree that focus on economic development takings may divert attention
from the real problems of eminent domain abuse. As the authors write, “the
bigger picture is condemnation in general, and private economic
development is only a part of it.”1 Here, I emphasize a few things not
discussed in their article, and sound a word of caution about their proposed
solution.
First, although facts matter, so does selling those facts to the public.
Although the facts here favored New London, many things—from the
appeal of individual plaintiffs over governments to the race and gender of
these specific plaintiffs—made it far easier for the public to be swayed by
the plaintiffs.
Second, Kelo was not Dred Scott in even more ways than the authors
state. By eleven years after the Court’s decision in Scott v. Sandford,2 it
had catalyzed a revolution in American history and had been decisively
abrogated by constitutional amendment. The decision itself denigrated all
individual rights of African Americans and the power of Congress to
protect them. Kelo v. New London,3 in contrast, is still good constitutional
law, the significance of the state response to it has been exaggerated, and
the case itself is fading from the public imagination. More importantly, the
decision leaves property owners with substantial rights (leading to a
$442,000 payout for Susette Kelo4), while the reverse would have left
impoverished cities with fewer means to compete with wealthier suburbs,
and placed the burden of eminent domain on those with the least power to
Wallace Stevens Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.
Wesley W. Horton & Brendon P. Levesque, Kelo Is Not Dred Scott, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1405,
1427 (2016).
2
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
3
545 U.S. 469 (2005).
4
George Lefcoe, Jeff Benedict’s Little Pink House: The Back Story of the Kelo Case, 42 CONN.
L. REV. 925, 954–55 (2010) (reviewing Jeff Benedict’s account of the events leading up to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Kelo).
*
1
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fight it.
Third, I point out some dangers in the authors’ proposal for closer
scrutiny for pretext. I agree that courts should scrutinize takings to
determine if they are a mere pretext for benefiting a private party, but this
was clear before the Kelo decision. And while most of the factors the
authors suggest are useful in this inquiry, some will undermine the benefits
of public-private partnerships in development, and contribute to clumsy
attempts by the judiciary to second-guess land planners. Thus, I worry that
the specifics of their proposal may encourage courts to play a role for
which they are not qualified, and may cause more harm than benefit for
social welfare.
That said, I also want to particularly thank Wes Horton for his work on
this case and his generosity in sharing his insights regarding it. Far from
being Dred Scott, the Kelo case is part of his long and distinguished history
of using the law to protect individual rights and the public interest.
II. FACTS MATTER—BUT SO DOES SELLING THEM TO THE PUBLIC
As Horton and Levesque write, facts matter, and most of them
supported New London. When the city proposed the plan, New London
was suffering.5 Divided into small, individually-owned parcels, it needed
land assembly to develop anything new.6 Fort Trumbull, meanwhile, was a
derelict, post-industrial brownfield. The U.S. Navy’s sound lab, which had
occupied a third of Fort Trumbull’s 90 acres, abandoned the site in 1996. 7
What was left included a junkyard, a railroad stockyard, oil storage
terminals, and car repair businesses.8 Fort Trumbull also housed a regional
sewage treatment plant.9 The plant had never been capped, and it smelled.10
The area had worn-out electrical and sewer services, few sidewalks, and no
public access to the Thames River.11 The redevelopment, in contrast,
would build on the city’s unique maritime history, a history that has

Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473.
See Bethany Berger, Wesley Horton, Thomas J. Londregan & Clark Neily, Selected
Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Thomas R. Gallivan Jr. Conference—Kelo: A Decade Later, 47
CONN. L. REV. 1433, 1437 (2015) [hereinafter Kelo—A Decade Later] (remarks of Thomas
Londregan).
7
Id. at 1438.
8
Id. at 1439.
9
Id. at 1438.
10
Id.; ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON & THE LIMITS OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 15 (2015) (noting that the sewage plant “periodically emitted a terrible odor that
annoyed many residents”).
11
See Kelo—A Decade Later, supra note 6, at 1439 (describing the infrastructure needs of the
Fort Trumbull area prior to the taking).
5
6
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recently created an economic and cultural “renaissance” in New London.12
Few people wanted to be in Fort Trumbull in the late 1990s. Eighty
percent of commercial properties were vacant, as were twenty percent of
residential properties.13 Eighty-eight percent of the structures were in poor
to fair condition, with only twelve percent in average condition.14 Susette
Kelo’s house—next to that smelly sewage treatment plant—had been
vacant for years until she purchased it in 1997, on the eve of the
redevelopment plan.15 The vast majority of the Fort Trumbull
landowners—owning 100 of 115 parcels in the redevelopment plan—sold
to the city without complaint.16 The nine holdouts owned only .76
acres17—less than one percent of the redevelopment area.
So these nine individuals were standing in the way of a development
that would help a troubled city remediate a brownfield and escape an
economic crisis. They were protesting government use of eminent domain
that, as Horton and Levesque write, the Supreme Court had approved for
fifty years, and likely longer.18 Both facts and precedent were on New
London’s side. But although New London won the legal battle (albeit by a
narrow 5-4 margin), it completely lost the public relations war. If facts
matter, why did that happen?
One reason is that the New London lawyers were only fighting the
legal fight, but the plaintiffs’ lawyers were fighting a media war from the
beginning. The Institute for Justice, which represented the plaintiffs,
considers the public narrative before it even takes a case.19 Their attorneys
came armed with press releases and staged public protests with their
plaintiffs. A search of Lexis and Westlaw’s newspaper databases between
1998 and 2001 reveals no articles on the Fort Trumbull fight before the
12
Ellen Albanese, New London’s Renaissance, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 9, 2014), http://www.boston
globe.com/lifestyle/travel/2014/08/09/new-london-renaissance/hQgGW62PzAewAgpzsB1wMJ/story.
html [https://perma.cc/UUX8-GPYF].
13
Kelo—A Decade Later, supra note 6, at 1440.
14
Id. For a good summary of facts supporting each sides’ perspectives on the case, see Lefcoe,
supra note 4.
15
The Kelo House (1890), HISTORIC BUILDINGS OF CONN. (Mar. 20, 2009), http://historicbuilding
sct.com/?p=1550 [https://perma.cc/DG5Z-M4PK].
16
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 474–75 (2005) (stating that area contained 115
parcels and the plaintiff owned fifteen).
17
Horton & Levesque, supra note 1, at 1410.
18
Id. at 1414–18; see also Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 229–30 (1984)
(upholding an act permitting the condemnation and transfer of a lessor’s property to the lessee for just
compensation); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 26 (1954) (upholding a congressional act allowing the
government to condemn property in D.C. for redevelopment); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining
Co., 200 U.S. 527, 527 (1906) (affirming the use of eminent domain to permit a mining company to run
transportation lines over private property).
19
See Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 931 (“[W]hen Chip Mellor founded IJ [Institute for Justice] in
1991, ‘he developed a simple formula for selecting cases: (1) sympathetic clients; (2) outrageous facts;
and (3) evil villains.’”) (citation omitted).

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

1434

[Vol. 48:1429

Institute got involved, and several praising Pfizer, Connecticut College
President Claire Gaudani, and the New London Development Corporation
for revitalizing New London and rescuing a decrepit brownfield.21 As soon
as the Institute for Justice filed suit, however, the stories about the bravery
of the plaintiffs and the villainy of Pfizer, Gaudani, and the NLDC began.22
The case proved the maxim that “[c]ommunication is now central to
management of modern litigation.”23
But even had New London’s attorneys armed themselves for the media
war, they would likely have lost. Narratives about governments trying to
do things to help people collectively are always less immediate than those
about the individuals themselves. Everyone could see themselves in the
homeowner plaintiffs. It was harder to see themselves in New London.
And distinctive facts about these plaintiffs made them particularly
resonant. The Institute for Justice made sure to highlight these. The
lawyers broke alphabetic order and placed Susette Kelo—with her little
pink house, fiery red hair, and quote-worthy conviction—first in the list of
nine plaintiffs. The gender of the two most prominent plaintiffs, Kelo and
Wilhemina Dery, may have been significant as well. Women have often
provided the public face of property rights protests24 and may well be more
20

20
The Hartford Courant had only one article about opposition to takings connected with the
Pfizer plant, but that was about widening a road outside Fort Trumbull to lead to the plant. Charles
Stannard, Deadline Nears in Race to Save Historic Houses, HARTFORD COURANT (May 26, 2000),
http://articles.courant.com/2000-05-26/news/0005260702_1_development-plan-howard-street-roadimprovements [https://perma.cc/3Q2Y-U3BQ].
21
See, e.g., Jon G. Auerbach, Pfizer Revives Connecticut ‘Brownfield’: Research Campus to Be
Built on Contaminated Urban Site, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1998, at A2 (“Drug giant Pfizer Inc. is giving
depressed New London, Conn., a shot in the arm.”); Tom Condon, My Kind of Town: New London
Prized its Streets, its Characters and Sense of Humor. Progress Almost Ruined it, HARTFORD
COURANT (Aug. 2, 1998), http://articles.courant.com/1998-08-02/news/9808110145_1_pequot-avenuepool-hall-arcade [https://perma.cc/M65J-SGC4] (“New London hit the municipal jackpot. Pfizer Inc.
announced it would build a $150 million research campus on a vacant stretch of waterfront a mile from
downtown . . . .”); Michele Jacklin, Cranes Are Everywhere in New London, HARTFORD COURANT
(Sept. 22, 1999), http://articles.courant.com/1999-09-22/news/9909220547_1_cranes-pfizer-connecti
cut-college [https://perma.cc/6AW4-ASXU] (“Clearly, both Connecticut College . . . and Pfizer are
acutely aware that the vitality and strength of their institutions largely depend on the vitality and
strength of the city they reside in.”).
22
Carrie Budoff, A Battle Against Eminent Domain: Gritty Dispute in New London, HARTFORD
COURANT (Jan. 1, 2001), http://articles.courant.com/2001-01-01/news/0101010379_1_susette-kelofort-trumbull-battle-against-eminent-domain [https://perma.cc/H2Y6-ZQSB] (quoting Gaudiani as
referring to the houses at issue as “‘slum’ houses”).
23
JAMES F. HAGGERTY, IN THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION: WINNING YOUR CASE WITH PUBLIC
RELATIONS xxii (2003).
24
See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 394–96 (1994) (establishing new restrictions
on exactions; female plaintiff); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 439,
441 (1982) (establishing new per se rule for physical invasions; female plaintiff); Richard Roesler,
Voters Consider Property Measures; Washington, Idaho Initiatives Modeled After Oregon Law,
SPOKESMAN REV., Oct. 8, 2006, at A1 (describing role of “poster grandma” Dorothy English in
securing passage of Oregon ballot initiative requiring compensation for regulatory restrictions); Laura
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compelling as the hapless defenders of the hearth against a grasping state.
All of the plaintiffs shared some characteristics that made them
especially easy to sell to the media and public. First, they were all white,
unlike the inner city owners who are more often the victims of urban
renewal efforts.25 Their houses, moreover, were single-family detached
buildings on the beach, so they looked like places where suburban and
rural voters could imagine themselves.26 The plaintiffs were tailor-made to
appeal to a wide swath of Americans.
Contrast the reaction to the bulldozing a few years ago of a
predominantly African American neighborhood in a historic district in
New Orleans to make room for parking and commercial space around a
new privatized Medical Center.27 While there were only a few holdouts in
Fort Trumbull, in New Orleans the state had to use its eminent domain
power to acquire 42% of the properties.28 Nevertheless, the media and
public attention was nothing like what greeted the Fort Trumbull dispute.
In fact, while the project was pending, Louisiana voters approved a partial
loosening of its post-Kelo restrictions on eminent domain.29 The Institute
for Justice, significantly, did not get involved.
In short, the facts may have favored New London, but the photos and
sound bites favored the plaintiffs. The result was a widespread outrage
that, by the summer of 2005, had critics comparing Kelo v. New London to
Scott v. Sandford.30 Nevertheless . . .
Oppenheimer, The Monday Profile: The Man Behind Measure 37: David Hunnicutt: Populist Lawyer
Reigns in Aftermath of Land Use Reversal, OREGONIAN, Dec. 20, 2004, at A1 (stating that property
rights activist was kidded about the effect of “Hunnicutt’s widows” as public faces of property fights).
25
Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of
Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 3, 6 (2003) (arguing that “blight” was invented to target
these communities, which were its primary targets).
26
Cf. Wendell E. Pritchett, Beyond Kelo: Thinking About Urban Development in the 21st
Century, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 895, 909 (2006) (attributing public reaction to fact that suburban
property owners of inner ring suburbs are now experiencing eminent domain).
27
Roberta Brandes Gratz, Why Was New Orleans’s Charity Hospital Allowed to Die?, THE
NATION (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/article/why-was-new-orleanss-charity-hospitalallowed-die/ [https://perma.cc/X2V2-FSAP]; Christopher Tidmore, Historic Black Neighborhood to Be
Sacrificed in New Orleans, L.A. SENTINEL (Dec. 11, 2008), https://lasentinel.net/historic-blackneighborhood-to-be-sacrificed-in-new-orleans.html [https://perma.cc/6KNW-BPYG].
28
Jared E. Munster, They Took My Bedroom: A Case Study of Eminent Domain in New Orleans
228 (Dec. 15, 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Orleans).
29
See John Lovett, Tragedy or Triumph in Post-Katrina New Orleans? Reflections on Possession,
Dispossession, Demographic Change, and Affordable Housing, 23 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & CMTY.
DEV. L. 289, 291 (2015).
30
60 U.S. 393 (1857). See Gwen Moritz, An Eminently Debatable Issue: Lawyers Digest
Practical Applications of Supreme Court’s Kelo Ruling, HIGHBEAM RES.: ARK. BUS. (Aug. 1, 2005),
https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-135247755.html [https://perma.cc/322F-UJJ5] (“Few rulings by
the U.S. Supreme Court are so momentous that their names enter the public conscience. Kelo v. New
London seems to have the potential to join Roe v. Wade, Miranda, Dred Scott and Brown v. Board of
Education.”); Mike Allen & Charles Babington, House Votes to Undercut High Court on Property;
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III. KELO IS REALLY, REALLY NOT DRED SCOTT
Despite the comparisons, Kelo v. New London is not Dred Scott in
even more ways than Horton and Levesque discuss. It is now eleven years
since the Supreme Court decided Kelo v. New London, and five years since
the late Justice Scalia (after comparing the decision to Dred Scott)
declared, “I do not think that the Kelo opinion is long for this world.”31 By
this time in the history of Scott v. Sandford,32 the decision set the terms of
the 1860 presidential election, contributing to Abraham Lincoln’s
victory.33 It was part of the propaganda leading to the Civil War in 1862.34
And by 1868, the nation had deliberately abrogated the decision in the first
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.35
Kelo has had little impact on the law in comparison. It is still valid on
the federal level. Even the state response has been exaggerated. Some cite
the forty-seven states that enacted laws responding to Kelo to indicate just
how wrong Kelo was,36 and even Horton and Levesque call the state
response “overwhelming.”37 Scholars who have studied the content of
these laws, however, generally conclude that most of them did not
meaningfully restrict eminent domain.38 One pair of property rights
attorneys even declares that for most of these statutes, “the facade of
reform is empty, and citizens are no better off than they were on the day
Kelo was decided.”39
Kelo is also fading from the American political imagination. When I
Federal Funds Tied to Eminent Domain, WASH. POST, July 1, 2005, at A1 (quoting House
Representative James Sensenbrenner as saying decision “has the potential of becoming the Dred Scott
decision of the 21st century.”).
31
Debora Cassens Weiss, Scalia Lumps Kelo Decision with Dred Scott and Roe v. Wade, ABA J.
(Oct. 19, 2011, 1:05 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/scalia_lumps_kelo_decision_with_
dred_scott_and_roe_v._wade/ [https://perma.cc/F79U-Y56R].
32
60 U.S. 393 (1857).
33
See The Political Quadrille. Music by Dred Scott, LIBR. OF CONGRESS PRINTS &
PHOTOGRAPHS DIVISION (1860), https://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2008661605/ [https://perma.cc/
CEF9-2WFV] (depicting Dred Scott playing the music to which the candidates dance in the 1860
presidential race).
34
Austin Allen, An Exaggerated Legacy: Dred Scott and Substantive Due Process, in THE DRED
SCOTT CASE: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND LAW 92 (David Thomas
Konig, Paul Finkelman, & Christopher Alan Bracey eds., 2010).
35
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside.”).
36
See Dana Berliner, Looking Back Ten Years After Kelo, 125 YALE L.J. F. 82, 89 (2015), http://
www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/looking-back-ten-years-after-kelo [https://perma.cc/E6MA-8TQQ].
37
Horton & Levesque, supra note 1, at 1420.
38
SOMIN, supra note 10, at 141–42 (2015); Marc Mihaly & Turner Smith, Kelo’s Trail: A Survey
of State and Federal Legislative and Judicial Activity Five Years Later, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 703, 703
(2011).
39
Nicholas M. Gieseler & Steven Geoffrey Gieseler, Strict Scrutiny and Eminent Domain After
Kelo, 25 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 191, 210 (2010).
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speak to students entering law school, some have heard of the decision,
some haven’t, and none have the kind of visceral reaction that was almost
universal several years ago. Donald Trump, moreover, became the
Republican presidential nominee even though, as Newsweek reminded
voters in July 2015, he was behind an egregious taking for economic
development.40 In the 1990s, at the request of Trump’s Atlantic City
casino, the city authorized the bulldozing of several homes and businesses
to create parking and open space around the Trump Casino Hotel.41 In
contrast to the facts Horton and Levesque bring out regarding the New
London plan, the private party (the Trump casino) was clear from the get
go, and there were almost no restrictions on how the casino could use the
land.42 Well before Kelo, the New Jersey courts struck down this blatant
giveaway to a private entity.43 Yet Trump has garnered the most votes in
the Republican primary, running in part on a campaign decrying
government abuse of the little guy.
Of course Kelo still has some political impact. In 2015, when I
organized a conference on the aftermath of Kelo, at least one city planner
said it would be too politically risky for her to participate. Connecticut
urban development lawyers tell me that cities are now much more reluctant
to use eminent domain for economic development. The result is that some
developments don’t happen, and those that do happen more slowly and
expensively than they would have otherwise. But this fading memory is far
from the political revolution that reversed Dred Scott.
Perhaps the most important difference between Scott v. Sandford and
Kelo v. New London is what the decisions mean for the least well off in our
society. Scott held that an African-American could never be a citizen,
could not invoke federal jurisdiction to seek his freedom, and that
Congress could not even limit the states in which slavery was allowed.44
Those whose properties are taken by eminent domain, in contrast, have a
constitutional right to compensation, as well as substantial procedural
rights to have those takings scrutinized. In this case, Susette Kelo was able
to translate her resistance into a $442,000 payoff for a house that she had
paid $53,000 for in 1997, and that was appraised at $100,000 in 2000.45
More important, a different result in Kelo would have
40
Daniel Bier, Remember When Trump Tried to Bulldoze a Widow’s Home to Make a Parking
Lot for Limos?, NEWSWEEK (July 21, 2015, 3:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/remember-whentrump-tried-bulldoze-widows-home-make-parking-lot-limos-355932 [https://perma.cc/4X9W-LX83].
41
Id.
42
Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102, 106 (N.J. Super. 1998) (invalidating
taking); see also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005) (declaring condemnations
invalid if they are “for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular private party”).
43
Banin, 727 A.2d at 110 (holding that taking would serve a private, not public, function).
44
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 406, 432 (1857).
45
Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 954–55.
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disproportionately hurt those who already have the least power in our
society. Land assembly for economic development in cities is necessary
precisely to help troubled cities, like New London, deserted by white flight
to the suburbs and jobs overseas, and trying to provide employment and
services for the people left behind. The dissenters in Kelo suggested that
such municipalities could only take properties that were themselves
blighted,46 and a number of states responded to Kelo by limiting economic
development takings to blighted properties.47 “Blight,” however, is more
likely to be found for properties whose owners are poor and non-white.
One scholar even argues that the concept of “blight” was invented to target
communities of color in eminent domain projects.48 Limiting eminent
domain to blight means reserving it for those who already have less
political clout to fight it.49 The decision in Kelo, in contrast, means that
cities can try to create economic development to help those who cannot
flee to the suburbs, and need not target their worst-off residents in doing
so.
IV. THE LIMITING PROPOSAL: SCRUTINY FOR PRETEXT
Finally, after convincingly arguing that Kelo is really not Dred Scott,
and perhaps to show that they are not any more in favor of eminent domain
abuse than the Institute for Justice, the authors propose a test to create
greater scrutiny of eminent domain actions.50 They argue that courts should
“look more carefully at all condemnations with Justice Kennedy’s eye to
see whether they qualify as a public use,” and name a number of factors
they think should be included in this inquiry.51 I agree with the authors that
takings should be scrutinized for pretext. I am not sure, however, that the
scrutiny they propose is either useful or necessary.
At the outset, Kelo was not the case that “for the first time . . .

46
See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 498–501 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted) (arguing
that a property must be designated as blighted before it can be acquired by eminent domain for private
use).
47
See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 24-2-2, 24-3-2 (2016); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33030 (West
2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 6A.22 (West 2015); MO. ANN. STAT. § 523.271 (West 2016); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 32.03(6) (West 2015); Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447,
464 (N.J. 2007) (invalidating a designation of a property for eminent domain taking solely because it
was “in need of development”); City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1145–46 (Ohio 2006)
(“[W]e hold that government does not have the authority to appropriate private property based on mere
belief, supposition, or speculation that the property may pose such a threat [to the public health, safety,
or general welfare] in the future.”).
48
Pritchett, supra note 25, at 3 (arguing that “blight” was invented to target these communities).
49
David A. Dana, The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the Poor After Kelo, 101
NW. U. L. REV. 365, 379–80 (2007).
50
Horton & Levesque, supra note 1, at 1426.
51
Id.
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mentioned the possibility of voiding a pretextual taking.” Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff53 did this expressly, noting that Hawaii
agreed that “the Constitution forbids even a compensated taking of
property when executed for no reason other than to confer a private benefit
on a particular private party” and that “[a] purely private taking could not
withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement.”54 Indeed, the much
maligned Poletown case, in which the Michigan Supreme Court upheld
condemnations so that General Motors could build a factory in Detroit,
agreed that “[w]here, as here, the condemnation power is exercised in a
way that benefits specific and identifiable private interests, a court inspects
with heightened scrutiny the claim that the public interest is the
predominant interest being advanced.”55
So scrutiny for pretext is not new or controversial. Potentially more
troublesome are the factors the authors propose. It should be noted that
these are all simply “factors” and the authors would not require
invalidation of a condemnation because one or the other factor is lacking.
In fact, the authors specifically reject bright-line tests, noting that “[b]right
lines are easy to apply, but are apt to permit some bad things and prohibit
some good things.”56 What follows, therefore, is less a critique of the
authors than a word of caution for courts and legislatures applying such
scrutiny in the future.
First, some of the factors may discourage public-private partnerships in
creating economic development. Factor one is “[w]ill a public body own or
operate the property?”57 While the public should be concerned about
privatization of essentially public functions, it is also clear that private
entities are simply better at many of the operations that lead to economic
development. As I ask my students, would you rather go to a mall operated
by the government or one operated by a private entity? How about a
government versus private cafeteria? As the Supreme Court said in Berman
v. Parker,58 “[t]he public end may be as well or better served through an
agency of private enterprise than through a department of government—or
so the Congress might conclude.”59 Legislative power to decide whether
private ownership will best serve public interest should not be chilled by
the search for pretext.
Similarly, the authors cite as a factor “[w]ere any private beneficiaries
52
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known at the time of the vote to condemn?” Again, it may well be that a
project has a better chance of success if a private beneficiary has already
committed to participate in the project. I agree lack of development in Fort
Trumbull today is primarily due to the long delay and bad press caused by
the litigation, as well as the fact that it placed the project on a collision
course with the 2008 recession.61 But another issue may have been that no
private developer was identified before the vote to condemn occurred.
Thus the plans were completed and the properties slated for destruction
before any private entity had put its money on the line committing to them.
Might bringing a private developer in early on have led to a better plan,
and a greater commitment to see the project through to completion?
In other places, the authors endorse more scrutiny as to whether the
project will succeed, and whether the condemnation is necessary to
accomplish the purpose.62 By asserting that this test should apply to all
takings, not just those where private entities will use the property, and that
it might have prevented the creation of “road or a bridge to nowhere,” the
authors seem to be advocating a general judicial scrutiny of whether a
government plan is in fact a good idea.63 This kind of inquiry was
specifically rejected in Kelo, Midkiff, and Berman,64 and for good reason.
It’s not that legislatures are necessarily good planners. Indeed, they are
often bad planners—and sometimes really, really bad planners—of roads
and public housing projects, just as of economic development projects. But
because judges are even worse planners, judicial oversight will not lead to
better results, nor will it effectively root out pretext. It will simply subject
what is best decided by experts subject to public opinion and scrutiny to
the distorting lens of adversarial litigation.
In the end, while I reject aspects of the authors’ proposal I agree with
them on the bigger picture. Despite its abuses, eminent domain is
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necessary to achieve the public interest, and bright line restrictions will
often undermine goals of public welfare and fairness. The best the law can
do is try to give governments the power to act for the public interest
without unduly favoring the powerful or burdening the vulnerable. Kelo,
by allowing troubled cities to try to bolster their economies through
comprehensive planning, struck the right balance here.

